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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
KENNE·TH FRIED·MAN and VIRGINIA
E. FRIEDMAN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respo"''lAdents,
-vs.MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation,
D·efendant and Appellant,
and
C. LESLIE WHEELER, JOHN H.
TE.MPEST, and JOHN H. TEMPEST,
JR., d.b.a. WHEELER & TEMPEST,
et al.,
Defendant's.

Case No.
8236

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMEN·T OF' F'ACTS
The statement of facts which appears in the appellant's brief under that portion labled "The Complaint"
which recites certain allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, is substantially accurate. No point would be served
by repeating those allegations.
Under the heading "Facts Established by the Evidence", the appellant reviews certain portions of the
evidence and testimony. These also are essentially accurate and correct, except for repe-ated statements by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appellant's counsel that the evidence is thoroughly conclusive that there is no possible negligence on the part of
Mountain Fuel Supply Company and no evidence whatever upon which liability might be imposed upon that
company. These statements are, of course, self-serving,
and upon reading them one wonders how such a law
suit could have arisen at all. Respondents take a completely contrary view, of course, and feel it necessary
to call to the attention of the Court certain matters alleged in this portion of the appellant's brief.
On page 5 of the appellant's brief the statement is
made that the gas furnace, gas water heater, gas service
line, gas meter and gas regula tor were all examined and
none showed any signs of leakage. In the argument,
under Point I, the respondents will contradict this statement and point to evidence which shows otherwise.
On page 7 of the appellant's brief the statement appears that all of the evidence points to the fact that the
gas main was struck and kinked by a mechanical digger.
In the argument under Point I testimony from the record
will be set forth in direct contradiction of this statement.
Further, upon page 7 of the appellant's brief, the statement is made that the defendants, Lundberg and Todd,
and their witnesses were evasive and never denied that
they had kinked or bent the gas main with a mechanical
digger. In the argument respondent will set forth their
testimony in direct contradiction of this statement.
Further, the Court's attention is invited to the jury
verdicts (R. 43-50), in which the jury found in favor of
Todd and Lundberg and against the plaintiffs.
2
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The material under the heading "Proceedings Following Close of Evidence" the respondents feel is essentially correct.
STATEl\1EN·T OF POINTS
POINT I.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT AND RESULTING
JUDGMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWIT:S:STANDING THE VERDICT.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED THE
APPELLANT FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE SECOND DEFENSE SET FORTH IN ITS
ANSWER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT TIIE JURY VERDICT AND RESULTING
JUDGMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWFTHSTANDING THE VERDI•CT.

In support of Point I, in the appellant's brief certain
Utah cases are cited and the legal principles therein set
forth respondents feel are correct. We feel it worthwhile
to comment upon a portion of a quotation from Seybold
v. Union Pacifie Railroad Company, 239' P. 2d 174, which
appears in 'appellant's brief. The Court says, among
other things, the following:
3
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"If there is any substantial competent evidence
upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably
could make the filnding, it should stand."

The only problem, therefore, is in the application of
this principle to the evidence adduced at the trial. The
burden of the respondents is to point out wherein sufficient competent evidence was presented from which the
jury could have acted as it did.
Counsel for the appellant makes the statement at
page 5 of the brief that the only conflict in the evidence
is whether gas escaping from the break in the gas main
entered the basement of the Friedman home through the
East wall or at the South end of the house near the
entrance of the gas service line, and that such conflict
is immaterial. With this statement the respondents completely disagree.
A. portion of the evidence presented to the jury was
Exhibit 33, a section of the gas main which was bent and
broken and from which gas escaped.
Let us assume, for purposes of argument, that the
source of gas which exploded in the basement of the
Friedn1an home was from the break in the gas main in
the street. The appellant vigorously disclaims any
culpability for the break, although the jury verdicts (R.
43-50) clearly sl1ow otherwise and that the jury felt that
the primary responsibility for the condition of the gas
main was th'at of the appellant, Mountain Fuel Supply
Company.
The testimony of Todd and Lundberg and their
witnesses should be called to the attention of the Court.
4
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tlJel,,:

Todd, who was an excavating contractor, testified respecting his work in the area and that his machine and
his employee probably excavated for the water service
line at the Friedman home. Todd specifically and clearly
denied ( R. 500, Tr. 366) that his machine or his employee
ever hit the gas main or touched it in any way. Clyde
Boggess, an employee of Todd, testified that the mechanical digger was never used to dig a trench completely to
the water main, but that the exc-avation for the last few
feet was done by hand with a shovel. Boggess testified
that he did the shovel work and specifically denies ( R.
510, Tr. 376) that the mechanical digger ever hit the gas
main.
Lundberg, one of the defendants, testified that he is
a plumbing contractor and that he laid the water service
lines in the area and also for the Friedman home. Lundberg testified (R. 487, Tr. 353), that the last portion of
the excavation to the water service main was done by
hand. Lundberg further specifically denied that he or
any of his employees (R. 292, Tr. 158), ever exeavated
for the water line or ever touched or bent the gas main.
Respondents feel that this is certainly evidence from
which the jury could have found as it did, that the gas
main was not bent by either of the defendants, Todd or
Lundberg.
It should be pointed out that no other solution to the
bent pipe or theory as to how it happened was ever
offered by the appellant.
Let us now assume for purposes of argument that
the gas main was laid perfectly and without a bend or

5
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break, as the appellant clamorously contends (although
the jury apparently didn't believe it). Does that fact
alone relieve Mountain Fuel Supply Company from the
charge of negligence or responsibility~ The respondents
feel that it does not necessarily have that result.
In the first place, a high degree of care is imposed
upon persons handling dangerous substances. Natural
gas sold and dispensed by the appellant falls in that
category.
Wit:k respect to the degree of care imposed, the following statement appears in Volume 24, American J urisprudence, page 682-3, paragraph 24, under the heading
"Gas Companies":
"It is generally held that a gas company must
exercise care and diligence in order to avoid injury
to the health or property of others by the escape
of gas. The degree of care which it must exercise
has been described as ordinary care, as due and
reasonable care, and as a high degree of care.
These terms, however, are said to mean no more
than that care and diligence should vary according
to the exigencies which require vigilance and attention, conforming in amount and degree to the
particular circumstances under which they are to
be exerted. In other wo·rds, in view of the highly
dangerous character of gas and its tendency to
escape a gas company must use a 'degree of care
to prevent the escape of gas from its pipes proportionate to the daJnger which it is its duty to
a,void."
Numerous cases are cited in support thereof, including Lawrence v. Scranton, 130 Atl. 428, 41 A.L.R.
454.
6
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There is further imposed upon gas companies the
necessity for maintaining a system of inspection of its
lines which will prevent the escape of gas and possible
injury to third persons. A good statement of the requirement to inspect is found in paragraph 26, under "Gas
Companies", page 683, of Volume 24, American jurisprudence. This statement is as follows:
"As pointed out above, a gas company must maintain such a system of inspection as will insure
reasonable promptness in the detection of leaks
that may occur from the deterioration of the
material of its pipes or from any other cause
within the circmnspection of men of ordinary skill
in the business, including the careless or wrongful
meddling of third persons and, except in cases
of breaks caused by some sudden calamity or an
emergency created by some happening which
causes many leaks at the same time, the gas
company should be prepared, with a sufficient
force, to repair any defects that may be discovered.''
In this connection the Court's attention is invited
to the case of Okmulgee Gas Co. v. Kelly, an Oklahoma
case, found at 232 P. 428. With respect to the duty of
inspection the Court says at page 430:
"The gas company owes the duty to see that the
pipe lines and fittings, when first laid in the
ground, with reasonable care and skill, will not
permit the escape of gas, and a system of inspection is required as will result in reasonable
promptness in the discovery of leaks, which may
occur from deterioration of the material, or from
other causes within contemplation by the company."

7
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The Court's attention is invited to the statement
from American Juris prudence requiring gas companies
by inspection to protect against happenings within their
knowledge or contemplation, including the careles·s or
wrongful meddling of third persons.
In connection with an examination of this matter,
the doctrine of concurrent negligence should he considered. Assuming for argument that negligent installation of the gas main and the subsequent negligent excavation resulted in damage to the main. The subsequent
negligence of a third person not connected with the
appellant does not relieve appellant, in the absence of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, from
the imposition of liability.
A good statement of the doctrine of concurrent
negligence is found in the Utah case of Hillyard v.
Utah By-Products Co., 263 P. 2d. 287. This case involved
a collision by ·a moving vehicle with one improperly
parked, resulting in death to a passenger in the moving
car. ·The statement of the doctrine of concurrent negligence, Jlowever, respondents feel is applicable to this
situation as well as to a collision.
Mr. Justice Crockett says the following in the opinion, at page 290 of 263 P. 2d:
"In ·addressing the question whether the parking
of the truck on the highway was an act of negligence, it should be remembered that an act is not
necessarily rendered non-negligent merely because it may Ee said that no injury would result
to another except for some subsequent act of
negligence. One is guilty of negligence when 'he
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does such an act or omits to take such a precaution that under the circumstances present, as an
ordinary prudent person, he ought reasonably to
foresee that he will thereby expose the interests of
another to an unreasonable risk of harm.' When
one does so he may be held liable for resulting
injuries caused by any reasonably foreseeable
conduct whether it be innocent, negligent or even
criminal."
The court further makes this statement on the same
page:
" ' * * the test of liability is not whether * * * the
defendant could * * * have foreseen the precise
form in which the injury actually resulted, but
he must be held for anything which * * * appears
to have been a natural and probable consequence
of his act. If the act is one which (he) * * * could
have anticipated as likely to result in injury, * * *
although he could not have anticipated the particular injury which did occur.' The court was
therefore justified in submitting the question of
defendant's negligence in parking the truck to
the jury; and the latter were warranted in finding
that such negligence existed."
In the light of these legal principles, namely, the
high degree of care imposed, the duty to inspect, and
concurrent negligence, let us examine the testimony.
The testimony of D..J. Robison, Assistant Superintendent of Distribution of the appellant, is significant.
Mr. Robison testified that there was no phase of the
installation, distribution or maintenance of natural gas
with which he was not familiar. (R. 221, Tr. 87)
He testified that no inspection of the gas main had
9
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been made from its installation in about February, 1948,
until the explosion inN ovember, 1951. (R. 231, Tr. 97)
He further testified that the gas main was laid after
the water main. (R. 228, Tr. 94) He further said that
the gas main in some places near where the break occurred was laid six inches from the water main. (R. 229,
Tr. 95)
Mr. Robison was questioned concerning a deposition
taken before the trial about the method of inspection
used by the appellant.
We feel it proper to quote from his testimony in
this respect, which is a.s follows: (R. 232, Tr. 98, R. 233,
Tr. 9·9)
"Q. Now, Mr. Robison, you will recall on last
Friday I took a deposition, and you testified
to certain things in response to my questions;
do you recall, in connection with that deposition-on Page 17 we are referring to-that
this' question was asked :
'As a matter of fact, in your company policy,
how frequently do you check the mains in that
area, or any other areas that you serve, for
breaks or damage~'
Do you remember making the answer:
'I don't know.'
A.

I believe I did, and said, 'NQ,' with the idea
in mind that you meant digging them up and
making ~a visual inspection of them.

Q. Do you recall being asked the question, then :
'You do not know~'
And you recall making the answer:
'I don't believe they are tested.'

10
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A.

That's right.

Q.

You recall being asked the question:
'As far as you know, you have no regular
program of inspection f
Do you remember making the answer:
'There is none.'

A.

There is none. There is no regular program;
there is a program.

Q.

And the further question:
'Of any of your mains~'
And do you recall making the answer :
'That's right.'

A.

Q.

A.

That's right.
Now, do you recall being asked this question:
'When trouble occurs, you go out and inspect
themf
That is correct.

Q. Do you reeall making the answer :
'Correct.'"
In view of Mr. Robison's position with the appellant company, and his kn<YWledge of the business, he
seems qualified to comment that they have no policy
of inspection.
Some further testimony by Yr. Robison is also
significant with regard to the policy of laying of gas
mains in the proximity of water mains and other facilities. He testified as follows: (R. 228, Tr. 94)

"Q. Now, will you refer again to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 33, and tell me, if you can, from an examination of it, approximately the distance
11
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between the gas main and the water main, as
MR. KASTLER:
(Discussion.)

That is '32'.

MR. ALLEN: Yes, I am referring now to Exhibit 32, the diagram.

A.

The lines were laid between six inches and a
foot apart.

Q.

In some places they are as close as six inches?

A. Yes ·sir.

Q. Now, Mr. Robison, what is the general praetice with reference to the laying of gas mains,
by your company, adjacent to water mains·¥
A. We try to lay them away from the water
mains some distance.
Q. In some instances, if it is possible, you put
them across the street, do you not f

A.

Yes sir.

Q. And this at least down the section that existed
in front of the Friedman home was laid pretty
clos-e to the water main f
A.

Fairly close.

Q. Now, why is it that you have a policy of laying
the gws main at some distance from the water
main¥
A. So that there will he no difficulty in us digging up our gas main, or the water company
connecting onto their water main, that we
will not get together and not get the wrong
pipe for-there will be room for each company to work on their individual lines.

12
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Q.

In other words, you lay them at some distance, so there won't be any danger of people
interfering with your gas lines, if they are
digging for some other legitimate purpose~

A.

Correct.

Q.

You recognize there Is possibility of that
occurring~

A. Yes sir."
It is clear from his testimony in this regard that the
gas company normally tries to lay its lines some distance
frmn water mains and other facilities for the very reason
that they are likely to be damaged by third persons
making legitimate installations. It is further clear that
this hazard is clearly within the contemplation of the
appeHant company.
The respondents therefore submit that upon the basis
of the testimony here adduced, there was sufficient competent evidence from which the jury could find that the
appellant company was negligent in failing to maintain
any policy of inspection or that it was concurrently
negligent, assuming a third party bent the gas main in
laying the gas main so close to the water main when
there was a clear recognizable possibility that it would
be interfered with by third persons, and that such interference might cause damage.
Previously in this brief the statement has been made
that respondents dispute the contention of appellant that
there could be no disagreement as to the source of the
gas which escaped in the Friedman home and exploded.
There is other evidence in the record which points to the
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possibility that the gas may have come from a defective
meter or gas regulator, and that under the evidence and
the instructions of the Court, the jury might have so
concluded.
In this connection respondents desire to call the
Court's attention to Instructions 25 and 26 (R. 111) which
are as follows:
INSTRUCTION 25
"If you find that gas causing the explosion escaped from some other source than the damaged
pipe in the street, you will find for defendant,
Todd, No Cause of Action."
INSTRUCTION 26
"If you can reasonably determine from the preponderance of evidence presented in this case that
the gas that caused the explosion in plaintiffs'
house came from some other source than the
damaged pipe in the street, your verdict should
be for defendant, Byron W. Lundberg, No Cause
of Action."
The respondents feel that these instructions were
proper and permitted the jury, under the evidence, to
consider•whether the gas came from a source other than
the broken main.
Mr. D. J. Robison testified that the .gas, the gas
mains, and everything up to and including the meter
inside the F'riedman home, was owned and controlled
by the appellant. (R. 230,231, Tr. 96, 97)
According to the testimony of Davis Watkins, Superintendent of Distribution of the appellant, the day following the explosion the gas meter was taken by the
1
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appellant. (R. 414, Tr. 28) The testimony of Mr. Watkins as to what examination was made of the meter is
very interesting. He testified as to the usual course of
inspection of meters at the shop of the appellant, and
contended that the meter from the Friedman house was
given the ·same treatment. He further claimed that tests
showed it did not leak.
H()!Wever, it is important to consider that he testified
he was not present when the gas meter was tested. (R.
409, 'l1 r. 276, R. 410, Tr. 277) The evidence further developed that it was the custom of the foreman of the shop
to sign the inspection card which is kept as a permanent
record on each meter from its purchase by the appellant
to its removal from service. In this instance, after the
tests made following the explosion, for some reason the
foreman did not sign the card. (R. 430, Tr. 296) No
satisfactory explanation was ever offered for this.
No one who actually physically handled or inspected
the Friedman meter was ever called to testify.
The record further shows that certain repairs were
made to the meter. Mr. Watkins testified that the gaskets
were replaced, meter torn down, plates removed, and
certain other work done upon it. (R. 430, Tr. 296) Mr.
Watkins contended, of course, that this was standard
procedure and did not necessarily mean there was anything the matter with the meter. Such testimony, however, was certainly evidence which the jury had a right
·to consider in determining in their minds whether the
meter was or had been defe'ctive.
Mr. Watkins further testified that no examination

15
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of the gas regulator was ever made so far as he knew.
(R. 431, Tr. 297)
Mr. Watkins was asked if it were possible for a
meter to leak in the event the gaskets broke or dried out.
He testified that it was possible. (R. 438, Tr. 304).
In connection with the consideration of another
source of gas than the broken main, testimony of Dr.
Melvin A. Cook of the University of Utah should be
carefully considered.
Dr. Cook is eminently qualified as an explosives
expert, and his qualifications were examined at some
length. (R. 172, Tr. 35, 36, 37) Dr. Cook was called to
make an examination of the premises the day following
the explosion. He made a narrative statement of the
kind of investigation he conducted. (R. 176, Tr. 39, 40)
He testified that the unmistakable physical evidence left
by the explosion showed that the focal point of the blast
was immediately above the meter, the gas inlet and the
regulator. (Exhibit 28, Tr. 47, R. 188, and Exhibit 21,
Tr. 52, R. 188)
The following testimony of Dr. Cook is signficant
on the matter of the place where the gas entered the
basement. He testified as follows: (R. 190, Tr. 54)
"Q. Do you have an opinion, from your investigation, as to the source from which the gas
came, that entered the basement in the position you have testified?
A.

Yes, the evidence of the explosion to me shows
that the gas came through at the point that
the gas main-gas line-came into the house.
Now, where it originated, beyond that, I
16
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wouldn't know, except that that was-this
particular repair-was going on in the front,
and I assumed that the hreak had occurred
there, but it was clear to me that it had entered the building, at any rate, on the south
side of the building, where the gas inlet came
into the building."
On cross-examination by counsel for Todd, one !of
the defendants, the following appears in the record: (R.
209, Tr. 74)
"Q. Now, according to your theory of the area of
concentration-the contour of this blast-had
there been a meter there that was leaking
at the time, or immediately prior to the explosion, could this same contour have o<.r
curred in the bla;st ~
A. Yes. if there were a leak, yes.
Q. Same kind~
A. That's right."
Dr. Cook's theory of the way in which the explosion
occurred was that gas jetted in from a point where the
gas inlet was located and the meter and regulator, and
with not too much diffusion reached a point approximately mid-way in the basement, where it was ignited
by the gas furnace or the pilot light of the gas water
heater. As a consequence, the greatest point of impact
and the focal point of the blast was the point near the
meter, causing singeing and extensive damage to the
south part of the house, and leaving the north part of
the basement relatively unscathed.
In his testimony Dr. Cook carefully explained, by
the use of numerous photographs to the jury, his theory
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of how the blast occurred. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 4, 5, 8,

9,10,21,22,24,25,26.27,28)
Respondents contend that upon the basis of all of
this testimony concerning the meter and concerning the
contour of the blast that there was evidence under Instructions 25 and 26 from which the jury might reasonably and fairly conclude that the source of gas which
exploded came from the area near the gas inlet line, and
possibly from a faulty meter or pressure regulator.
Counsel for the appellant comments on the injuries
to Mrs. Friedman. The facts concerning the sensation
she felt and the circumstances which occurred at the
blast are clearly set forth in the transcript. (R. 144, 145,
Tr. 8, 9) There can be little question that the portion of
the house in which Mrs. F'riedman was seated came down
all around her as if shaken by an earthquake. It is further
clear that one of the F'riedman children ~sitting close to
her mother was thrown from her chair by the force of
the explosion and suffered an injury to her head. (R.
145, 146, Tr. 9, 10)
Respondents submit that the physical effect of the
blast upon Mrs. Friedman is entirely sufficient to justify
the award made to her.
In summation of the argument under this point, respondents feel that upon a fair consideration of all the
evidence before the trial jury the requirement of the
S'eybold case, has been met.
"If there is any substantial competent evidence
upon which a jury, acting fairly and reasonably,
could make the finding, it should stand"
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

In appellant's brief, under its Point 2, contending
that the trial court should have granted a new trial,
appellant admits that the principal point is whether there
is substantial evidence upon which the jury could have
returned the verdict that it did.
The evidence and argument based upon it is amply
set forth in the argument under Point I of this brief,
and we see no useful purpose to be served by repeating
the ,same material here.
Appellant also contends that it was prejudiced by
certain instructions of the trial court. The respondents
contend that upon a full consideration of the evidence,
the instructions complained of did not prejudice the appellant.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED APPELLANT FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE SECOND DEFENSE SET FORTH IN ITS ANSWER.

The simple question presented by this point is whether, because the plaintiffs provided themselves with insurance against the damage which occurred, the appellant should have the right to insist that the insurance
company, if any, be made a party to the action, or whether the defendant is hurt by a non-joinder of the insurance
company.
The respondents contend that the only purpose in
suggesting or requiring the insurance company to be
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made a party is to be able to bring the fact that the plaintiffs had insurance before the jury in an attempt to
prejudice the plaintiffs thereby. The appellant cannot
s~riously contend, nor does it, that it might be subjected
to double liability by any court in this state if the insurance company is not made a party. It is abundantly
clear that the appellant would be completely and absolutely protected against any such result.
It should be pointed out that before the matter was
tried, a motion was filed by the respondents to strike
the second defense. This motion was heard and denied
by one of the Judges of the Third District Court.
Thereafter, at the trial, the appellant made an offer
of proof concerning the second defense, which was denied
by the trial judge. The respondents are wholly in accord
with the statement made by the Court when the offer of
proof was denied, which statement is fully set forth in
the appellant's brief on page 21.
It should also be considered that after the motion
to strike the second defense was denied, the appellant
made no move or effort to procure an order of court
requiring the respondents to make the insurance company
a party.
Further, there is no contention on the part of the
appellant that it has or had any defense which might be
asserted against the insurance company which it was
not in a position to assert against the plaintiffs and
respondents.
In support of the appellant's position, two Utah
cases are cited, the first, National Union Fire Ins. Co.
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v. Denver & 1L G. R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, and
the other, Bank of America 11-,ork v. Smith, 44 Utah 284,
14(] P. 122. The respondents take the position that neither
of these cases is in point, based upon the circumstances
in the case at issue.
In the National Union Fire Insurance Company
case, the insurance company sued in its own nmne to
recover $250.00 which it had paid of a $600.00 loss suffered by the insured. The question in that case was
not whether the insurance company was a necessary
party, but whether it had the right to sue at all. The
case held that the insurance company had the right. The
respondents contend that the insurance company in this
case might have sued in its own name, but was not a
necessary party.
The Court's attention is invited to the following
language from the National Union Fire Insurance Company case, found at page 655 of 137 P.:
"Starting out with the postulate that under our
own statute the claim in question was assignable
and that the real party in interest must sue, why
could not respondent bring this action upon the
cause of action in th'is case precisely the same
as it might sue on any other cause of action 1 Does
the fact that some other person or persons may
also have or claim to have some interest in the
claim sued on deprive the respondent of the right
to sue 1 We think not."
The second case cited by appellant involved an
action by the bank against defendants on a subscription
contract among them to put up money to build a bri'dge.
The secretary of the defendants' asso'Ciation borrowed
21
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money from the bank on the strength of the agreement.
The question arose as to whether the bank could sue as
an equitable assignee of the contract. The Court held
that the bank was able to bring the action. The case does
not hold, however, that the signers of the agreement
would not be able to bring an action based upon it, and
the following language from that case is pointed out to
the Court:
"But no objection was made that the plaintiff was
not the real party in interest. The defense made
is based on the ground that in no event are appellants liable either to the plaintiff or to any one
else."
Neither of these cases appears to be a holding that
the insurance company or an assignee of a right of action
is a necessary party. In ihe second case cited that question was never even raised.
The respondents are entirely in accord with the
statement of the trial court in this case which is quoted
verbatim on page 21 of the appellant's brief. In support
of that position the responaents invite the Court's attention to the following Utah cases:
In the case of Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P. 2d 777,
there was an action to recover for personal injuries and
for damage to an automobile as a result of a collision.
The trial court limited recovery for damage to the car
to $50.00, which was the amount of the deductible insurance contract.
This court held tliat such a limit was error by the
trial court. In that case the insurance company was not
joine'd. The defendant and appellant in that case relied
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upon Johansen v. Cudahy Packing Company, 152 P. 2d
98. In commenting upon the Johansen case, Mr. Justice
Wade has the following to say, at page 780 of 169 P. 2d:
" The case was dismissed by the trial court. One
of the grounds for disn1issal was that the plaintiff could not maintain such action because the
insurance company as a result of the payn1ent had
been subrogated to the claim of the plaintiff. We
held that to the extent of the amount paid by it,
the insurance company was subrogated to the
claim of the plaintiff, that since plaintiff had a
claim in excess of the amount paid by the insurance company she was also interested in the claim
and was a proper party plaintiff and could maintain the action, on behalf of herself and as trustee
for the insurance company; that there was only
one cause of action which could not be divided
into two suits; that some courts hold that the insurance company would be a proper party plaintiff, and some even go so far as to hold that it is
a necessary party and in case it refused to join
as plaintiff it must be joined as a defendant, but
that the failure to join the insurance company
was at most a defect in parties which defendant
by its failure to raise had waived and therefore
the action should proceed in the name of the
plaintiff alone."
On the same page the opinion has the following
language, which the respondents claim is applicable to
the situation at bar:
"As pointed out in the Johansen case, supra, even
though the insurance company is subrogated to
a part of the claim of the plaintiff, against the
defendant, that does not create another cause of
action and there can only be one suit to recover
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on that cause of action. Thus this action will bar
any future action on this cause of action whether
plaintiff recovers the amount paid by the insurance company or not, even though the insurance
company is not made a party to this action."
The respondents think that the case of Loggie v.
Interstate Transit Co., a California case found in 291 P.
618, is applicable. In that case an action was brought
to recover for personal injuries and damage to an automobile. The jury found in favor of the defendant and
the trial court granted a new trial ba;sed upon misconduct of counsel. The misconduct of counsel was the attempt to show that the plaintiff had insured himself and
had been compensated for the damage he suffered. The
following language from that case, found at page 619
of 291 P., is significant:
"It was error to overrule the objection to the
foregoing question on cross-examination, because
it was wholly immaterial whether Renshaw was
the representative of an indemnity insurance company, and the jurors doubtless inferred from the
question and answer that the plaintiff was protected by such insurance. The offer of proof,
however, was more prejudicial, implying that the
plaintiff ha:d been fully compensated for the
damage to his automobile, and the first thought
of the jurors, unfamiliar with legal principles,
probably was that, having received full compensation for his loss from one person, the plaintiff
was not entitled to a second recovery for the
same loss."
The Court further says on the same page the following:
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" 'Damages recoverable for a wrong are not
diminished by the fact that the party injured has
been wholly .or partly indemnified for his loss by
insurance effected by him, and to the procurement
of which the wrong-doer did not contribute; and
this is equally true * * * though the insurance
company, by reason of having paid the loss, is
entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the
insure'd as against the tort-feasor, or to recover
back from him the amount he recovers. The question who will be entitled to the proceeds of the
recovery, the insurer or the insured, is a matter
between )'hem, and constitutes no defense to an
action for the damages caused by the wrong
which, in any event, must be brought in the name
of the insured owner although it might be for the
use of the insurer.' 8 R. C. L. 557; Clark v. Burns
Hamman Baths, 71 Cal. App. 571,575, 236 P. 152."
See also the case of Lebet v. Cappobiacho, 102 P. 2d
1109.
CONCLUSION
The respondents feel, as hereinbefore stated, that
a full, fair and complete review of the testimony and of
the physical exhibits presented to the jury provided it
with clearly sufficient competent evidence upon which
their verdict could be based, and the respondents submit
tnat the verdict of the jury and the judgment entered
thereon ~should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.
REX J. HANSON
Attorneys for Plailntiffs aoul
R.espondents.
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